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A UNIFORM LAW FOR INTERNATIONAL SALES *
JOHN HONINlOLD t
To cope with, the uncertainties and complexities of conflicting national laws,
international traders have been forced to devise various makeshifts to reach
commercial understanding. The inadequacy of these expedients, the Author
argues, demonstrates the need for reforming and unifying the underlying
law. A project to draft a uniform law is now in being. In this Article,
Mr. Honnold, an authority on United States sales law, weighs the consti-
tutional objections, examines some of the substantive provisions of the drafts
and the problems of multilingual drafting, and argues strongly for the
participation of this country in the project.
Determined work by several other nations during the past quarter-
century has produced important progress towards the creation of a
Uniform Law for the International Sale of Goods. Through ignorance
rather than design our country has remained outside this project. The
time has come to examine the need for such a uniform law and to decide
whether we should share in this work.
The reasons which have led other nations to take up this work
apply with full force to the United States. Our foreign trade, running
at an annual rate of thirty billions of dollars, faces legal uncertainties
which indeed are more serious than those which in this country forced
the states to join in a wide range of uniform legislation, such as the
Uniform Sales Act. That need arose even though nearly all of our
states shared the same legal tradition of the common law so that
* Part of the research for this Article was done, with the aid of a Fulbright
Research Grant, at the Facult& de Droit of the Universit6 de Paris and at the Centre
Frangais de Droit Compar6, and at other centers in Europe with the aid of a Guggen-
heim Fellowship; to all of these grateful acknowledgment is due.
t Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania.
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lawyers in one state could come to grips with the ideas governing sales
transactions in other parts of the country. The legal problems now in-
volved in trade with Britain and with other countries with common-law
traditions in some ways resemble the problems which confronted our
states before the Uniform Sales Act. But the larger part of the world
-the continent of Europe, the American republics to the south and
much of Asia and Africa-confronts the American trader with legal
systems which stem from different roots; even if he crosses the linguistic
barriers and has access to the relevant codes, treatises and decisions he
encounters concepts which are either meaningless or deceptive. And it
is cold comfort to contemplate the feasibility either of finding an "ex-
pert" in the foreign law and making his explanations intelligible to
an American court or of presenting American law to a foreign tribunal.
All these complications would arise even if American and foreign law
were well suited to overseas trade. But unhappily many of the foreign
legal systems, like the Uniform Sales Act, were formulated before the
development of modern practices in international trade and at important
points ignore or contradict them.'
Alert foreign traders employ a variety of tools to cut their way
through this thicket. Many businesses which specialize in foreign trade
have developed detailed form contracts which seek to resolve the
questions on which the law may be unsettled or in conflict. For some
commodities trading can be carried on with dispatch by referring to
1. The Uniform Commercial Code sets forth detailed rules designed to meet some
of the practices and problems peculiar to overseas sales. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
§§ 2-319 to 2-325 (hereinafter cited as UCC). Cf. UCC art. 5, Letters of Credit,
See text accompanying note 64 infra. The code has been adopted in Pennsylvania,
Massachusetts and Kentucky. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A (1954) (follows 1953 version
which was substantially revised by the 1957 draft) ; MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 106 (1957) ;
Ky. Acts 1958, ch. 77. Adoption of the code by additional states may be anticipated
in coming years, but the process of adoption state by state is necessarily slow.
The half-century which followed the promulgation in 1906 of the Uniform Sales Act
(USA) produced only thirty-four adoptions, in spite of the fact that the Uniform
Sales Act through its close adherence to existing law provided few points of contro-
versy. The Uniform Commercial Code breaks much new ground; this increases not
only its usefulness but also the areas of dispute concerning its wisdom.
Unhappily the Uniform Commercial Code can do nothing to resolve the often
enormously complex problems concerning whether an American or foreign tribunal
will apply American or foreign law to the international sales transaction. For a
discussion of the nature of these difficulties, see RABEL, THE CONFLicr OF LAWS, A
CoMPARATIVE STUDY (1950); LALIVE, THE TRANSFER OF CHATTELS IN THE CONFLICT
OF LAWs (1955). Cf. Draft Convention on the Law Applicable to International
Sales of Goods, 1 Am. J. ComP. L. 275 (1952) (English translation) ; Reese, Some
Observations on the Eighth Session of the Hague Confereiwe on Private International
Law, 5 As. J. ComP. L. 611 (1956) (discussion of draft convention on the law
governing transfer of title in international sales of goods). The current version of
the Uniform Commercial Code has retreated from earlier attempts to require the
courts of states which adopt the code to apply the code if the transaction has any one
of a series of stated contacts with the forum. Compare UCC § 1-105(1) with UCC
§ 1-105(2) (1953). Cf. Goodrich, Conflicts Niceties and Commercial Necessities,
1952 Wis. L. Rnv. 199.
A UNIFORM LAW FOR INTERNATIONAL SALES
standard contracts drafted by trade associations; and under the auspices
of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, detailed
standard contracts have been prepared for international sales of lumber,
citrus fruit, cereals and machinery. 2 In addition, foreign traders,
through their organizations, have written out some of the complex
connotations of the cryptic terms, such as "C.I.F." and "F.A.S.,"
which are important in international sales. Unhappily, two formula-
tions of these trade terms compete on opposite sides of the Atlantic, but
businessmen can reduce misunderstanding by specifically incorpo-
rating one of them into their contract.8 Finally, machinery for arbi-
tration is widely used in international sales; in this manner businessmen
seek to escape from conflicting and antiquated national laws into a
regime of commercial understanding.4
These various measures for legal self-help, although highly useful
in skill 1 U UL remove 1 .... improving andunify - ing
the underlying law. Private codes of obligations derived from a
2. Copies of these standard contracts for international sales may be obtained from
the United Nations. U.N. Eco. CoMa'N EUROPE, CONTRACT FOR THE SALE OF
CEREALs (U.N. Pub. Sales No. 1957. II. E/Mim. 21, pts. IA, 1B, 2A, 2B, 3A, SB,
4A, 4B); U.N. Eco. COMM'N EUROPE, GENERAL CONDITIONS FOR THE SUPPLY AND
ERECTIoN OF PLANT AND MACHINERY FOR IMPORT AND EXPORT (ME/188 bis/53)
(ME/574/55) (U.N. Pub. Sales No. 1957. II. E/Mim. 3); U.N. Eco. Coa-i'N
EUROPE, GENERAL CONDITIONS FOR EXPORT AND IMPORT OF SAWN SOFTWOOD
(ME/410/56) (1956); U.N. Eco. Comm'N EUROPE, GENERAL CONDITIONS FOR THE
INTERNATIONAL SALE OF CITRUS FRUIT (U.N. Pub. Sales No. 1957. II. E/Mim. 12).
Some of these alternative contract forms are designed for different types of quotations;
one reflects terminology prepared for trade among Western countries, and invokes
the rules of the International Chamber of Commerce on arbitration and on the
meaning of trade definitions (hereinafter cited as INCOTERMS), whereas another
which omits these references is appropriate for trade with Eastern countries. For
a summary of the work of the Economic Commission for Europe in the preparation
of standard contracts for international sales see Organisation des Nations Unies,
Commission Economique pour l'Europe, Note sur les Mithodes d'Unificatiot du Droit
Suivies par la Commission Economique pour rEurope, in 2 UNIFICATION OF LAW,
YEARBOOK 1956, at 251, 258-67 (1957).
3. The two competing formulations are: (1) REvisED AMERICAN FOREIGN TRADE
DEFINITIONS (1941), prepared by a joint committee representing the Chamber of
Commerce of the United States, the National Council of American Importers, and
the National Foreign Trade Council, and (2) INCoTERMs (1953), prepared by the
International Chamber of Commerce.
4. A conference held at New York under the sponsorship of the United Nations
led to the approval on June 10, 1958, of a Convention on the Recognition and Enforce-
ment of Foreign Arbitral Awards. See ICC News, July-Aug. 1958, No. 5. The
initial impetus for this step to unify and strengthen the enforcement of such awards
came from the International Chamber of Commerce; preparatory work for the con-
ference was done by the United Nations. See U.N. EcoSoc COUNCIL OFF. REC.
19th Sess., Annex Item 14 (E/2704) (1955) (draft of proposed treaty and report
of committees); U.N. EcoSoc CouNcIL OFF. REC. 21st Sess. 133 (E/2822) (1956)
(comments on draft). For some of the underlying problems, see Domke, On the
Enforcement Abroad of American Arbitration Awards, 17 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB.
545 (1952) and related articles in the symposium in the same issue; Nussbaum,
Treaties on Commercial Arbitration, 56 HARv. L. REv. 219 (1942); Wahle, Inter-
national Aspects of Arbitration Reform, 10 AR. J.(n.s.) 140 (1955); Bruns &
Motulsky, Tendances et Perspectives de l'Arbitrage International, 9 Rsv. INT. DE
DR. CoMp. 717 (1957).
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contract are often unavailable because of hurried completion of the
transaction by telephone or cable; and many concerns-especially small
businesses-are not sufficiently established in foreign trade to have
worked out complete contract formulations. Nor can the parties by
agreement free themselves from local rules restricting the validity of
agreements or imposing technical rules for their formation. Agree-
ment to arbitrate disputes also fails to provide a complete answer: in
the course of performance the parties need a guide for their obligations
so that they can avoid misunderstandings by meeting the other party's
expectations or, if a dispute must go to arbitration, so that an award
can be based on a standard conforming to the parties' reasonable
expectation.
Efforts by interested nations to meet these problems have carried
a project for a Uniform Law for International Sales to an advanced
stage. Initially sponsored by the International Institute for the Unifi-
cation of Private Law, a distinguished commission drawn from various
countries of Europe produced a preliminary draft in 1935." The work
was, unfortunately, interrupted by the war. But in 1951 an interna-
tional conference, in which twenty nations participated, 6 was convened
at the Hague to deal with the subject of a revised draft. This con-
ference approved the project and suggested further improvement in
the draft. The most recent draft reflecting the suggestions of the Hague
5. The initial committee was composed of Judge A. Bagge (Sweden), Mr.
H. Capitant (France), Mr. M. Fehr (Sweden), Prof. H. C. Gutteridge (Great
Britain), Dean J. Hamel (France), Dr. E. Rabel (Germany), and Sir Cecil J. B.
Hurst (Great Britain), President. Information in the drafting of this statute and
of similar projects is collected in an invaluable series of volumes entitled UNIFICATION
OF LAW published in Rome in 1948, 1954 and 1956 by the International Institute for
the Unification of Private Law. The volumes of this series will be cited: UNrri-
CATION OF LAw (1948), UNIFICATION OF LAW (1954), etc. The early background of
the project, and the 1939 draft, are discussed in UNMCATION OF LAW 56, 102 (1948).
The text and report appear in PROJET D'UNE LoI UNIFORME SUR LA VENTE INTER-
NATIONALE DES OBJETS MOILIERS CORPORELS ET RAPPORT (1939) (U.D.P., Projet I
(1)). The basic research for the work is reflected in RABEL, DAS RECHT DES
WARENKAUFS (1: 1930, 11: 1958). Cf. Cohn, A Unified Law of Sale of Goods, 21
J. COMP. LEG. & INT'L L. (3d ser.) 244, 246 (1939) ; Prudhomme, D'un Projet de Loi
Internationale sur la Vente, 64 J. Du DR. INT. 5 (1937); Nadelmann, Unification of
Private Law, 29 TuL. L. REv. 328-(1955); David, The International Institute of Rome
for the Unification of Private Law, 8 TuL. L. REv. 406, 412 (1934). Nearly forty
nations are members of the International Institute for the Unification of Private Law.
Unhappily, the United States is not a member.
6. The following sent representatives: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland,
France, Germany, Great Britain, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Nether-
lands, Norway, Portugal, San Marino, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and Vatican City.
Observers were sent by the United States, Bolivia, Chile, Cuba, Yugoslavia, the UN
Economic Commission for Europe and the International Chamber of Commerce.
Rabel, The Hague Conference m the Unification of Sales Law, 1 A-m. J. CoMP. L.
58 (1952); UNIFICATION OF LAW 31 (1954). The "observer" status of the United
States was, in fact, nominal, consisting of the attendance of a staff member of the
local embassy. The conference, sponsored by the Rome Institute, was held at the
Hague in 1951 on the invitation of the Government of the Netherlands and followed
immediately the seventh session of the Hague Conference on Private International Law.
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conference was completed in 1956; this draft will be the subject of a
further international conference after interested nations have submitted
their comments.'
The fact that the United States has not yet taken an active part
in this work is more reminiscent of older patterns of isolationism than of
our current pretensions to strong participation in world affairs. There
are, indeed, reasons for our interest which reach even beyond the
question of adherence to the final draft. If other countries should adopt
the Uniform Law for International Sales, it would comprise the law
which their courts would apply to sales transactions with American
concerns.' The project is important also as a laboratory for com-
parative research for the improvement of our domestic law, since it
embodies a distillation from differing legal systems of those solutions
to the problems of sales law which commend themselves to a distin-
guished international group of scholars. No reputable American
scientist would do his work in ignorance of comparable research in
other countries; it would be fortunate if the same could be said of the
law.9
7. The original text and accompanying report, both written in French, are dis-
tributed by the Permanent Secretariat to the Special Commission, Ministry of Justice,
the Hague. PROJET D'UNE Loi UNIFORME SUR LA VENTE INTERNATIONALE DES OBJETS
MOBILIERS CORPORELS, NouvEAu TExTE ]-LABOR]- PAR LA COMMISSION ET RAPPORT DE
LA COMMISSION (1956) (hereinafter cited as REPORT OF THE DRAFTING COMMISSION).
An English translation of the text of the law, also distributed by the Hague secretariat,
is published under the title DRAFt OF A UNIFORm LAW ON INTERNATIONAL SALES OF
GOODS (1957) and reproduced in 7 INT'L & CoMP. L.Q. 3 (1958) ; quotations of the
Uniform Law for International Sales (ULIS) herein will be taken from this version.
The 1956 draft was prepared by a Special Commission, designated by the 1951 Hague
conference, with the following members: M. Pilotti (President of the Hague Con-
ference), V. Angeloni (Italy), A. Bagge (Sweden), F. de Castro y Bravo (Spain),
L. Fr~d~ricq (Belgium), M. Gutzwiller (Switzerland), J. Hamel and A. Tunc
(France), Baron F. van der Feltz (Netherlands), T. Ascarelli (representing the Rome
Institute), 0. Riese (Federal Republic of Germany), B. A. Wortley (Great Britain),
and P. Eijssen (Netherlands), Permanent Secretary.
8. If a sales transaction has the specified international character, a court of a
country which has adhered to ULIS could apply ULIS even though the transaction
ran between other countries which had not adhered to the law. Under article 2
(quoted note 12 infra), the international character depends on specified contacts with
"different states" without requiring that these states have adhered to the law. This
language was deliberately selected. REPORT OF THE DRAFTING COMMISSIOn 28. For
the broad sweep of the rules on choice of law prescribed by the 1953 version of the
Uniform Commercial Code see note 1 supra.
9. For discussion in American publications of the 1939 draft see Keyes, Toward
a Single Law Governing the International Sale of Goods-A Comparative Study,
42 CALIF. L. REV. 653 (1954); Rabel, The Hague Conference on Unification of Sales
Law, 1 AM. J. CoMp. L. 58 (1952). For commentary on the current 1956 draft see
Lagergren, A Uniform Law of International Sales of Goods, 1958 3. Bus. L. 131;
Wortley, A Uniform Law on International Sales of Goods, 7 INT'L & COMp. L.Q. 1
(1958); Riese, Der Entwurf sur internationalen Vereinheitlichung des Kaufrechts,
1957 ZErrSCHRIFr FUR AusL UND INT. PR. 16-116.
A draft of a Uniform Law on the International Sale of Personal Property, pre-
pared by the Inter-American Juridical Committee, was presented at the 1953 meeting
of the Inter-American Council of Jurists. See Kuhn, Draft of an Inter-American
Uniform Law on International Sales, 48 AM. J. INT'L L. 126 (1954) ; cf. Schroeder,
19591
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It is now too early to attempt to answer the ultimate question of
whether the United States should adopt the Uniform Law for Inter-
national Sales. The preparation of a code which will be understandable
and acceptable to countries of widely differing legal traditions is a
formidable task; in spite of the painstaking work which has already been
done, many problems remain. And since the United States has not
yet participated in the project, the questions which naturally arise from
an American point of view have not yet been presented to the draftsmen.
The issues which are ripe for consideration are these: Is it con-
stitutionally possible for the United States to take part? Does the
project embrace a significant and well-designed area? Does the current
draft show sufficient promise to justify our interest? What are some
of the questions and lines for further improvement suggested by the
present draft? Are there lessons of a general nature to be learned from
this experiment in the unification of legal rules governing international
transactions ?
I. SCOPE OF THE UNIFORM LAW
Overtures to the United States inviting its participation in pro-
grams for the unification of law have often been rebuffed on the ground
that constitutional power over the problem under consideration has
been reserved to the several states and therefore lies beyond the com-
petence of the national government."0 It therefore is necessary to
examine the scope of the Uniform Law for International Sales, both to
ascertain the part it would play in our commerce and to provide a basis
for assessing the competence of the national government to implement
the law. First we shall sketch the rough outline of the scope of the
Uniform Law only so far as is necessary to expose the constitutional
question; we shall then consider some troublesome problems of inter-
pretation of these provisions which should be considered as the drafting
process continues.
Our domestic legislation for unification, such as the Uniform
Sales Act, embraces the entire body of state law and thus extends to the
purely domestic transactions within each state. On occasion, this
pervasive approach to unification has been employed even on an inter-
An Inter-American Uniform Commercial Code, 2 W. REs. L. REv. 42 (1950). The
Council resolved, inter alia, that the drafting had not been preceded by the necessary
study of comparative law, that the Juridical Committee should undertake this study
and at the same time should circulate the provisional draft for comment. INTER-
AMERICAN JURIDICAL YEARooK-1952-1954, at 209-15, 250 (1955). In view of the
relatively mature state of the Rome-Hague project, it will be the focus for this
discussion.
10. Nadelmann, Ignored State Interests: The Federal Government and Inter-
national Efforts To Unify Rules of Private Law, 102 U. PA. L. REv. 323 (1954).
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national scale, notably through the Geneva Convention of 1930 which
has established rules for bills of exchange and promissory notes through-
out much of Europe.1 There is, however, no possibility for the general
acceptance of a program to unify the law governing both domestic and
international sales transactions. The only available choice is between
an indefinite continuation of the present unhappy state of the law and
the isolation of the international sale for separate treatment.
The Uniform Law for International Sales (ULIS) operates within
a limited field in that it applies only to sales which have a double
international aspect: both the parties and the sales transaction must
have a specified international character. This double requirement can
best be explained by two examples. First: A New York seller and a
Boston buyer make a sales contract calling for the shipment of goods to
France. In spite of the international shipment, ULIS does not apply
since the parties lack the requisite international character. Second:
A New York seller and a French buyer, through negotiations in the
United States, make a contract for the sale of goods which will remain
in the United States. Although in this case the parties have the requi-
site international character, ULIS is not applicable for lack of the second
requirement: a specific international character of the transaction. 12
At one point the draft does reach significantly into internal
sales transactions. Under article 8 the parties are presumed to have
agreed to the application of the Uniform Law when "the buyer has made
known to the seller, before the conclusion of the contract, that the goods
bought have been or will be resold under a contract governed by this
11. See Hudson & Feller, The Internatimal Unification of Laws Concerning
Bills of Exchange, 44 HAIv. L. Rxv. 333 (1931); UNIFICATION OF LAW 270-83 (1948).
Numerous fields of law, including sales, have been unified among the Scandinavian
countries. Id. at 321; id. at 487 (1954) ; id. at 277 (1956).
12. ULIS art. 2 reads: "This law shall apply to contracts of sale entered into
by parties whose places of business, or in default thereof, whose habitual residences
are in the territory of different States, in each of the following three cases:
"(a) when the contract implies that the goods sold shall be carried, or that when
the contract was concluded they had been carried, from the territory of one State to
the territory of another;
"(b) when the acts of the parties constituting the offer and acceptance have not
all been carried out within the territory of the same State; as regards contracts by
correspondence, the acts constituting the offer and acceptance are to be considered
as having been carried out within the territory of the same State if the correspondence
constituting the contract has been dispatched and received within the territory of that
State;
"(c) when delivery of the goods has to be made within the territory of a State
other than that within which the acts constituting offer and acceptance were carried
out."
The first example posed in the text is governed by the opening paragraph of
article 2 which states the necessary international character of the parties; the second
example is controlled by paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) which enumerate the ways
in which the transaction may assume an international character.
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law." '1 At this point the draft may reach a transaction which, standing
alone, does not involve the international movement of goods but which
is included because of its close relationship with another transaction
which does have the requisite international character.
The Constitutional Question
As we have seen, the heart of the Uniform Law for International
Sales is its application to the typical import or export transaction, in-
volving a seller and buyer located in different countries and the ship-
ment of goods in international commerce. Even without invoking the
treaty power, there can be little question of the power of Congress to
apply the law to these transactions under its power "To regulate Com-
merce with foreign Nations." The necessity to act as one nation in
dealing with foreign trade was one of the important forces behind the
adoption of our Constitution, and from the beginning the Supreme
Court has given wide scope to national power over foreign commerce.
14
The only constitutional question worthy of mention relates to the
law's extension to domestic sales between parties who know that the
goods have been or will be the subject of an international sale.1" The
draftsmen have concluded that this provision is needed to avoid the
difficulty which could arise if, for example, an exporter finds that the
obligations imposed upon him in a foreign sale are different from those
obtained from his domestic supplier.' For reasons which will soon be
13. ULIS art. 8(a). Under article 8(b) a correlative presumption arises in a
local sale if the seller has obtained the goods in a transaction which is subject to
ULIS and "before the conclusion of the contract, has notified the buyer of the obli-
gations of his own seller and that he has undertaken the same obligations towards
his own buyer."
Since article 8 is written in terms of a presumed agreement for applicability of
the law, it would appear to be subject to the rule of article 7 that agreements choosing
the law are effective when the parties have "their places of business . . . within
the territory of different states." (Emphasis added.) But the contrary view con-
cerning the need for international parties is expressed by the draftsmen's report.
REPORT OF THE DRAFTING CoMMISSION 47.
14. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8: "The Congress shall have Power . . . to regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States . . . ." See 1 FAR-
RAND, THE REcoRDs OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION 19, 449-53 (1911); 2 STORY,
COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION § 1057 (4th ed. Cooley 1873). In Gibbons v.
Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) 1, 195 (1824), Chief Justice Marshall observed: "The
genius and character of the whole government seem to be, that its action is to be
applied to all external concerns of the nation . . . ." The breadth of national power
over foreign commerce was generally recognized from the beginning of our consti-
tutional development, and even by judges who then took a more narrow view of
commerce among the several states. For collections of cases see 2 WILLOUGHBY,
CONsTITUTIONAL. LAw OF THE UNITED STATES §§ 417, 576 (2d ed. 1929); THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 123 (Corwin ed. 1953).
15. ULIS art. 8, discussed at note 13 supra. As was there noted, the law creates
only a presumption of an agreement for its applicability, and probably only applies to
international parties.
16. REPORT OF THE DRAFTING Coa-rss o 47.
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stated, this extension presents practical problems of administration
which make its wisdom questionable.17 But if this provision should
receive final international approval and should be accepted by the
Congress, there should be little question but that this ancillary control
would fall within Congress' authority to take action necessary and
proper for the effective regulation of foreign commerce.
18
The Uniform Law, since it would emerge from international diplo-
matic negotiation, could also be supported by the national treaty
power. 9 Although this part of the constitutional structure has recently
been a target for criticism, a long and ancient line of decisions of the
Supreme Court has made it clear-if indeed the point needs clarifica-
tion-that the Constitution empowers the nation to deal with problems
of international concern by a treaty which has the force of law. 0 Even
the narrowest view of the legitimate area for international negotiation
would certainly embrace the furtherance of our foreign trade and the
removal of grounds for dispute between businesses located in different
countries. Thus, whether enacted as legislation or ratified as a treaty,2'
there is no constitutional barrier to considering the proposed Uniform
Law on the merits.
17. See the discussion at note 24 infra.
18. The supporting decisions of the United States Supreme Court are legion-
ranging from the Shreveport Rate Case, 234 U.S. 342 (1914) (national control of
rate for local shipment), through NLRB v. Fainblatt, 306 U.S. 601 (1939) (labor
relations in plant producing goods for sale in same state), to United States v. Sullivan,
332 U.S. 689 (1948) (retail sale of drugs bought from wholesaler in same state
subsequent to interstate shipment). Cf. United States v. Ferger, 250 U.S. 199 (1919)
(national control of issuance of fraudulent bill of lading although issuer did not plan
interstate shipment); Atchison T. & S.F. Ry. v. Harold, 241 U.S. 371 (1916) (bill
of lading covering final intrastate leg of interstate journey).
19. U.S. CoNsT. art. II, § 2: The President "shall have Power, by and with the
Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two-thirds of the
Senators present concur . . . ." Id. art. VI: "[A]ll Treaties made, or which shall
be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the
land .... "
20. Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199 (1796) (treaty insured collectibility
of alien's debts contrary to state law) ; Chirac v. Chirac, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 259
(1817) (right of aliens to hold land) ; Hauenstein v. Lynham, 100 U.S. 483 (1879)
(treaty overrode state law barring descent of land to alien). Cf. Missouri v. Holland,
252 U.S. 416 (1920) (hunting restriction for migratory game). See generally Suther-
land, Restricting the Treaty Power, 65 HARV. L. REv. 1305 (1952); de Vries, Uni-
versalisme et Unification du Droit aux Jtats-Unis d'Amnrique, 7 Rav. INT. DE Di.
Coup. 542, 546 (1955).
Significant precedents have been set by American participation in international
conventions to unify rules governing the liability of carriers by sea and air. See
KCNAcrrv, THE Aum cAx LAW OF OcEAwN BILus Or LADiNG 118-31, especially 130
(4th ed. 1953); Mankiewicz, Hague Protocol To Amend the Warsaw Convention,
5 Am. J. Coup. L. 78 (1956).
21. The greater flexibility in some situations of the legislative approach to uni-
formity is discussed in Nadelmann & Reese, The American Proposal at the Hague
Conference on Private International Law To Use the Method of Uniform Laws,
7 Amd. J. Cozon. L. 239 (1958). Cf. Nadelmann, Uniform Legislation vs. International
Conventions, in IxNmT-ATioNzA. TRADE AnmrrRArioN 167 (Domke ed. 1958).
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Unresolved Problems Concerning the Scope of the Law
In considering the constitutional power of the United States to
share in this project, certain questions of interpretation of the Uniform
Law were met but were not explored, for the area of doubt did not
carry the law into constitutional difficulty. But, in assessing the
advisability of our participation, careful attention must be given to the
clarity with which the scope of the law is defined.
Often in the preparation of statutes it is unwise to try to anticipate
the wide range of problems which may arise; instead, it may be the
better part of statutory wisdom merely to point the way for development
of law in the courts. But this restrained approach to drafting is hardly
suitable in defining the scope of this law. As is shown by the legal
chaos which now exists in foreign trade, uncertainty over which legal
regime is applicable casts doubt on every judgment concerning the
problem. No pains should be spared to minimize the area of doubt
concerning the applicability of the Uniform Law.'
For the most part, the scope of the present draft of the law not
only is narrow but also is defined with clarity. To be sure, ULIS
does take a significant step beyond the narrowest test of an international
transaction: a contract requirement that the seller ship the goods across
an international boundary. Instead, it is enough if the contract "im-
plies" that the goods "shall be" carried from one state to another;
ULIS would thus include transactions in which a foreign buyer arranges
for the hauling, as in a contract which contemplates that an American
buyer would send his trucks to the factory of a seller in Mexico.3 This
broader reach seems appropriate in view of the importance of inter-
national transactions between countries with a common land frontier in
which the buyer may readily take delivery at seller's place of business
in the buyer's own trucks. Furthermore, only thin technicalities separate
transactions in which seller arranges for international shipment at
buyer's expense from those in which the buyer handles the transporta-
tion through transportation agencies which follow his instructions; the
draftsmen in rejecting any such artificial distinction avoided a source of
difficulty in the application of the Uniform Law. At first glance one
might anticipate difficulty in deciding whether the contract "implies"
international shipment when the agreement fails explicitly to state the
destination of the goods. But in most cases these doubts will not arise
since the necessity for securing clearance of goods through customs, for
22. See GurmiDGE, ComPARATIw LAw 159 (2d ed. 1949).
23. ULIS art. 2, quoted note 12 supra. By the same token, ULIS would seem
to be applicable to many tourist purchases, such as an American tourist's purchase in
Germany of a Volkswagen which he is expected to drive to another country.
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which the seller must prepare supporting documentation such as a
consular invoice, will clearly brand the international shipment.
Much more troublesome is the extension of ULIS to transactions
in which the contract implies that the goods sold "had been carried"
from one state to another, thereby embracing sales from stockpiles
brought to the buyer's country prior to the making of the contract.
24
At first glance it appears that only the thinnest of technicalities could
distinguish between shipments which precede the contract and those
which follow, and that therefore both must be governed. However,
this extension presents more serious problems of interpretation. Unlike
the case of international shipment after sale, there is here no need for
co-operation between seller and buyer to clear the goods through
customs; it thus seems particularly difficult to find tangible evidence
of whether a contract "implies" that the goods are of foreign origin.
In addition, a foreign seller who sells from local stocks of goods in
many cases will be sufficiently identified with buyer's country to become
familiar with its laws and customs. Further work on ULIS should
give careful consideration to the question whether any advantage from
covering transactions in which international shipment precedes the
contract is outweighed by the difficulties of administration.
Presumed Agreements for Applicability
There remains the problem of the workability of provisions,
already briefly encountered in connection with the power of the United
States to adhere to ULIS, which would extend its scope to certain
local sales which precede or follow an international sale. From this
point of view we must examine the language of article 8 under which
the "parties shall be presumed to have agreed to the application of this
law: (a) to sales in which the buyer has made known to the seller,
before the conclusion of the contract, that the goods bought have been
or will be resold under a contract governed by this law. . . ." As we
have seen, this provision has the worthwhile objective of providing a
single set of rules for closely-linked domestic and foreign transactions.
But this extension of the law would be difficult to administer. One
problem arises from the elusive nature of the evidence bearing on the
basic question of whether one party has "made known" to the other
the existence of the international contract. The Uniform Law, follow-
24. ULIS art. 2(a), quoted note 12 supra. The language of ULIS at this point
seems sufficiently broad to catch goods which "had been carried" across an inter-
national boundary by any prior owner, no matter how remote from the present trans-
action. This extreme sweep probably was unintended, and this discussion assumes that
at least on this point the current draft will be corrected. It will, however, be remem-
bered that holding that the transaction has the requisite international character meets
only one of the two statutory requirements: under article 2 the parties also must
have the specified international character.
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ing continental commercial practice and recent legislative change in
Britain, does not require that the sales agreement be evidenced by any
formality such as a writing; ' and even if there is a written sales agree-
ment, article 8 makes operative communications between the parties
"before the conclusion of the contract." Controversy over the existence
of such a communication would render doubtful the basic question of
the applicability of the Uniform Law; and indeed uncertainty could
develop over whether an alleged communication about the related
international transaction covered all of the essential facts from which
the applicability of the Uniform Law could be deduced. At this point,
the draftsmen have attempted to lay down the boundary line for the
Uniform Law across a particularly difficult terrain; the benefits of
extending the law to local transactions which are closely linked to
international sales are almost certainly outweighed by uncertainty
concerning the scope of the law.'
The fact that the definition of the scope of the law needs further
attention is, of course, no reason for discouragement. The typical
import and export transactions are clearly covered and foreign trade
thereby is removed from the embarrassments resulting from the com-
peting claims of national legal systems and from collision with a legal
system which was not designed either to be intelligible to foreigners or
to meet the peculiar needs of foreign trade. The unsolved problems
seem susceptible of solution as the drafting process continues; the
Uniform Law can provide a workable basis for separating from the
mass of domestic sales the international transaction requiring special
treatment.
25. ULIS art. 19, quoted note 27 infra. Britain's repeal of the statute of frauds
for sale of goods was effected by the Law Reform (Enforcement of Contracts) Act,
1954, 2 & 3 Eliz. 2, ch. 34, § 2. For some of the background for this step see Law
Revision Committee, Sixth Interim Report, [1937] 2 Weekly N. 284, 285. Cf.
Second Report, Mercantile Law Commission, 354 PAR,. PAPERS 6 (1855) ; Rabel, The
Sales Law in the Proposed Commercial Code, 17 U. Cai. L. Rxv. 427, 433 (1950).
Although there seems little reason to question the strong trend towards removing
formal requirements surrounding the making of sales contracts, for reasons which
have already been suggested any area of doubt as to the choice of law should be
avoided wherever possible. Compare the 1956 Draft Convention on the Jurisdiction
of the Selected Forum in the Case of International Sales, which in article 2 requires
written evidence of an agreement selecting the forum. See 5 Am. J. ComP. L. 653
(1956) (English text).
26. Article 9 sets the basic scope of the law. It applies to "sales of goods"; it
does not apply, inter alia, to "stocks and shares, negotiable instruments or money"
or to "registered ships, vessels used in inland navigation or aircraft." Under article
10, the fact that seller is to manufacture or produce the goods does not remove the
transaction from the law "if the party undertaking delivery is required to supply the
raw materials needed for such manufacture or production." But, as under the Uniform
Sales Act, there can be doubt concerning contracts for the affxation of materials to
realty, such as the erection of a plant and installation of machinery in a buliding, and
also transactions in which the seller's services are predominant, such as repair of
machinery and painting and repair of buildings. The Uniform Commercial Code has
removed some but not all of these problems. See UCC §§ 2-105(1), -107.
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Aspects of Sales Law Covered
Several important problems which may arise in sales transactions
have not been dealt with by the Uniform Law for International Sales
because of the peculiar difficulties anticipated in reaching international
agreement. There are in fact ample reasons for legislators to undertake
to unify divergent national rules on the formation of international con-
tracts, such as the conflicting rules on the revocability of offers. Indeed,
some of these problems which lie at the root of the very existence of
a contract need greater help from positive rules of law than many
questions arising in the administration of the sales contract, since these
latter questions, when anticipated by alert counsel, can be avoided by
careful drafting of the agreement. Nevertheless, most of the problems
concerning the making of the contract have been excluded from the
present draft." The same self-restraint was practiced by the older
Anglo-American codifications, the Sale of Goods Act "a and the Uni-
form Sales Act. Although the sales article of the Uniform Commercial
Code has dealt with several of these troublesome questions, 28 one cannot
criticize the draftsmen of the Uniform Law for International Sales for
declining to take this bolder course. If further collaboration in the
unification of law produces a climate favorable to wider agreement,
attention can then turn to the project, which is still in an early stage,
for a convention on the making of international contracts by correspond-
ence.
29
The scope of the Uniform Law for International Sales was further
restricted by the decision to focus on the mutual obligations of the seller
27. ULIS art. 12. The question of the legality of the contract is also remitted
to domestic law. Ibid. These general provisions are, however, qualified by article 19
which provides: "No particular form is required for a contract of sale. It may be
proved by means of witnesses." This article would permit the enforcement of oral
agreements which, in most of the states, are subject to a statute of frauds. Cf. USA
§4; UCC §2-201. ULIS also seems to lay down a rule concerning the validity of
contracts in article 67: "The parties may not plead any rule of municipal law which
renders invalid a contract which does not stipulate a price."
27a. 1893, 56 & 57 Vict. ch. 71, §§ 16-20.
28. E.g., UCC §§ 2-202 (parol evidence), 2-204 (formation; definiteness), 2-205
(nonrevocability of certain offers), 2-206 (offer and acceptance; acceptance by dif-
ferent medium than offer), 2-207 (additional terms in acceptance or confirmation),
2-302 ("unconscionable" contracts .outlawed). Some of these sections, especially
2-207 and 2-302, have proved to be among the most controversial of the code.
29. A premliminary draft of a Uniform Law on International Contracts Made by
Correspondence (1936) was prepared in conjunction with early drafts of the Uniform
Law for International Sales. UmIcATIozN OF LAw 25-27, 71-83, 160-67 (1948) (text
of draft). After the decision of the Special Commission on Sales not to include
this material in ULIS, the Rome Institute set up a special committee to carry this
work forward. INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR THE UNIFICATION OF PRIVATE LAW,
REPORT OF AcTrvrrY 9 (1956). This committee's draft of April 1958 proposed a
uniform law limited to the making of contracts for the international sale of goods.
Article 2 states that this law would apply to contracts which are governed by the
Uniform Law for the International Sale of Goods (ULIS). U.D.P. 1958-Etudes
XVI/A, Formation des Contrats-Doc. 10. These two projects are thus intimately
linked, and could at a later stage readily be merged.
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and buyer, and to exclude problems of the claims against the goods by
third parties such as creditors. ° This decision also is consistent with
our own experience with unification. The Uniform Sales Law, while
incorporating by a rather vague reference the confusing common-law
doctrines on bona fide purchase,31 expressly left the question of the
rights of sellers' creditors to the conflicting rules of the various states02
It is certainly too early in the international field to hope for successful
unification of the rules affecting the rights of third parties, although, as
in the case of the making of international contracts, this problem is
receiving attention.'
In general, the Uniform Law for International Sales deals with
those problems of sales law which are covered by the Uniform Sales
Act: seller's obligations with respect to delivery and quality of the
goods; the circumstances governing buyer's obligations to pay the price;
transfer of risk of loss; responsibility to take care of rejected goods;
remedies for breach. Its style is not alien to an American lawyer. More
fully articulated than highly generalized formulations like the French
Civil Code, in length and approach it is not unlike the Uniform Sales
Act. There is, however, a significant difference in style at some points
where the necessity to hammer out a draft which would be clear to the
various members of an international drafting group has rubbed away
the metaphysics which in the course of time have developed around local
formulations. In Rabel's vigorous language, the draft abandons
Cawesome relics from the dead past that populate in amazing multitude
the older codifications of sales law." " Although we shall encounter a
30. ULIS art. 12: "This law shall govern only the duties of the seller and the
buyer arising from a contract of sale; in particular, it shall not be concerned ...
with the effect the contract may have on the ownership of the goods sold . .. ."
ULIS does deal with other problems, such as risk of loss, which Anglo-Americans
are accustomed to relate to the "property" concept. ULIS arts. 109, 110 (risk of
loss). See text accompanying note 54 infra. Cf. arts. 62, 63 (seller's obligation to
the buyer that the title be good). For the decision in Scandinavian and German Law
formulations to focus on the obligations of the immediate parties to the sales contract
see LAGERGREN, DELIVERY OF GOODS AND TRANSFER OF PROPERTY AND RISK IN THE
LAW OF SALE (1954) ; Cohen, A Unified Law of Sale of Goods, 21 J. Comp. LEG. &
INT'L LAw (3d ser.) 244 (1939); Lawson, The Passing of Property and Risk, A
Comparative Study, 65 L.Q. Rev. 352, 358, 362 (1949).
31. The preservation in § 24 of the Uniform Sales Act of the question-begging
distinction between void and voidable titles hardly served to unify the law of bona fide
purchase. See 2 WILLISTON, SALES §§ 346-48 (rev. ed. 1948).
32. USA § 26. Cf. UCC § 2-402.
33. An attempt to unify the rules on choice of law is reflected in the draft con-
vention on the Law Governing Transfer of Title in International Sales of Goods,
approved at the 1956 Hague Conference on Private International Law. For the text
see 5 Am. J. Co Ip. L. 650 (1956), discussed by Reese, supra note 1.
34. Rabel, The Hague Conference on the Unification of Sales Law, 1 Am. 3.
Comp. L. 58, 61 (1952). See also Ekeberg, The Scandinavian Cooperation in the
Field of Legislation, in UNIFIcAYioN OF LAw 321, 337 (1948) (clarity resulting from
international cooperation in drafting).
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few more relics which could well be abandoned, the drafting has already
brought clarity to several problems which are surrounded by fog in
local formulations. The result may be of value in clarifying our law
even for domestic purposes; it certainly is an advantage for transactions
in which understanding must reach across diverse legal systems.
II. A SAMPLING OF THE SUBSTANTIVE RULES OF THE
UNIFORM LAW
It is not, of course, feasible to survey here the entire draft of the
Uniform Law for International Sales. But some appreciation of its
approach and method can be gained by examining its handling of two
signicant problems: seller's obligation with respect to the quality of the
goods and risk of loss.
The Quality of the Goods
Although the provisions of ULIS on the problems which we relate
to the concept of "warranty" are not its most striking or controversial
features, we must consider them briefly for they underlie the basic rights
and remedies of the parties and thus are of concern to traders whose
transactions would be governed by the law.
Unfortunately, no statute can provide ready-made or easy answers
to the basic question concerning the quality of goods required under
sales contracts. The most that any statute can do is to remove barriers
which would interfere with a mature and flexible interpretation of each
contract in the light of mercantile understanding. Strangely enough,
prevailing sales law needs help even to reach this goal. It is perhaps
ironic that English case-law at one point came close to reaching the
simplicity and the flexibility needed for handling sales contracts when
in 1877 Judge Brett wrote that there is one rule which "comprises all
the others": the goods must answer "the real mercantile or business
description" which is "contained in words in the contract, or which
would be so contained if the contract were accurately drawn out." 35
But the law became complicated as judges, in the course of distinguish-
ing unwanted precedents, created separate types of implied warranty
surrounded by technical and artificial rules. Codifiers conscientiously
trying to preserve rather than to reform perpetuated these technicali-
ties.58 Thus, dealers are subjected to a warranty of "merchantable
quality" the scope of which can only be dimly appreciated by going
35. Randall v. Newson, 2 Q.B.D. 102 (1877).
36. Chalmers, in drafting the British Sale of Goods Act, 1893, followed instruc-
tions to "reproduce as exactly as possible the existing law." CHALMMrS, SALE oF
GOODs Acr at viii (12th ed. 1945) (introduction to 1st ed.).
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through a mass of case-law. And under the Uniform Sales Act this
important warranty arises only when the sale is "by description," a
requirement on which even the case-law sheds only darkness. A
separate warranty of fitness for purpose depends on a showing of
specified communications between buyer and seller and buyer's reliance
on the seller's skill and judgment; but this warranty is subject to a
limitation in the case of sales under a patent or other trade name which
is so inconsistent with the rest of the statute that the limitation has been
read out of the statute by most of the decisions8 7  Although students of
sales law in this country can be trained to cope with these mysteries
the dismay of a foreign lawyer who must wrestle with these problems
has to be seen to be appreciated. Through an interesting parallel
development, continental sales law has been similarly embarrassed by
technicalities surrounding the notion that an obligation as to quality is
a collateral guaranty separate from the sales contract; students of the
common law who try to make their way through the resulting confusion
will not emerge soon or with substantial enlightenment.88
The Uniform Law for International Sales fortunately escapes much
of this difficulty; its basic rules are simple, and would perhaps appear
insignificant to one who has not struggled through the technicalities of
the present law. Under the Uniform Law the seller is obliged to deliver
goods which "possess the qualities and characteristics expressly or
impliedly contemplated by the contract." 89 These few words provide a
37. The warranty of "merchantable quality" and the "by description" mystery
are embodied in USA § 15(2). On the problems of the latter see 1 WrLSTON,
SALES §§ 224-25 (rev. ed. 1948); Cf. HONNOLD, SALES AND SALES FINANCING 60-62
(1954). On the "trade name" problem under USA §§ 15(1) and (4) see 1 Wu-
LISTON, SALES § 236(a) (rev. ed. 1948). The Uniform Commercial Code cuts through
most of this thicket. See UCC §§ 2-312 through -315. See State of New York,
Law Revision Commission, Study of Uniform Commercial Code, Article 2-Sales,
LEG. Doc. No. 65(C) at 52-69 (1955).
38. Under the Civil Code of France and of those countries which follow its formu-
lations, it is necessary to distinguish between: (a) an action for failure to perform
an obligation (art. 1134) (compare our action based on "express warranty"); (b)
actions based on existence of a hidden defect (vice cach; art. 1643) (compare our
"implied warranties"); and -(c) disappointment of buyer's expectations which give
rise to an action for erreur (arts. 1109-10, 1117). These various actions are based
on different showings, and are governed by distinct rules governing the speed within
which the buyer must act and the amount of recovery. See HAMEL, 10 PLANIOL ET
RrPmR, TRArrt PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANCAIS § 126 (2d ed. 1956) ; Morrow,
Warranty of Quality: A Comparative Survey, 14 TUL L. REv. 327, 329 (1940);
Rabel, The Nature of the Warranty of Quality, 24 TUr.. L. REv. 273 (1950). See
REPORT OF THE DRAFnNG COMMISSION 31.
39. ULIS art. 40(5). Local complications are further reduced under article 41,
which excludes remedies available under local law (such as mistake) from the cir-
cumstances covered by article 40. See note 38 supra. It is, however, somewhat
surprising that under the language of article 41 this unifying principle applies to
"the circumstances to which the foregoing Article relates," and thus might not apply
to the following articles 42-44 on sales by sample or model. Perhaps in view of
article 43 the "undertaking" that goods conform to a sample may be deemed one of
the constructed obligations covered by article 40. Cf. UCC § 2-312(1) (c) (1952).
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basis for a unified, powerful and realistic approach to a solution to the
most pervasive problem of sales law. The most important part of this
rule, of course, is the enforcement of implied contemplations of the
parties. Especially in hurried mercantile transactions, often effected by
cable, it is not practicable to articulate all of the reasonable expectations
of the parties. In fact, some of the most important understandings are
not expressed simply because they are so basic that they are taken for
granted: for this reason an order for a piece of machinery may not
specify that it will perform in a manner customary for that kind of
machinery or that steel beams will be free of flaws which impair the
strength of material of this type. Further, the general principle in-
corporated in ULIS seems to be the only line of thought capable of
rationalizing case law under the Uniform Sales Act which holds goods
of very low quality to be "merchantable" under one contract while hold-
ing goods of reasonably good quality "unmerchantable" in light of the
stronger expectations reasonable in another contractual setting.
4°
These few words giving legal effect to the express and implied
expectations of the parties under the contract, if fully understood, would
probably be sufficient. But to avoid misunderstanding by those ac-
customed to more detailed formulations, ULIS adds, in a manner
reminiscent of the implied warranties of the Uniform Sales Act, that
compliance with the contract includes the obligation that the goods
possess the qualities "necessary for their ordinary or commercial
usage," or for "some particular purpose expressly or impliedly con-
templated by the contract." 41 But the ULIS emphasizes, more help-
fully than existing formulations, that in a society in which an almost
infinite variety of goods must compete there is no place for abstract or
doctrinaire standards for quality: the only satisfactory point of reference
is the contract in question, construed in the light of those expectations
which are reasonable in the particular contractual setting.
40. This basic test of ULIS also seems consistent with the distinctions which
have been developed to determine whether goods are subject to a "defect" (vice)
under formulations like the Civil Code of France. See CODE Civi. arts. 1625,
1641-43 (Fr. 53d ed. Dalloz 1954). HAMEL, op. cit. mipra note 38, § 128.
41. ULIS art. 40(3), (4). At this point, ULIS makes one rather surprising
retreat from its policy to frame only general rules. All of the law's rules implementing
implied understandings, as set forth in article 40(3)-(5), are by article 13 made
inapplicable "to sales of living animals." The draftsmen state that the degree of
national legislation makes unification impracticable. REPORT OF THE DRAFnING CoM-
missioN 48-49. Cf. HAMEL, op. cit. supra note 38, §§ 125, 362-81 (special rules in
France concerning sales of domesticated animals). The present draft, in enforcing
certain express obligations and excluding implied obligations could be interpreted as
establishing an international rule of caveat emptor, at least where no national legis-
lation applies. The 1939 Rome Draft (art. 3) avoided this problem by excluding the
entire domain of quality obligations concerning living animals from the scope of the
Uniform Law. The present draft requires further attention at this point.
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This general endorsement of seller's duty to comply with the
implied obligations contemplated under the contract provides a strong
basis for protecting the interests of buyers. But lest buyers be given a
basis for imposing immaterial or trivial objections to seller's perform-
ance, ULIS adds the important rule that- no deviation of quality or
quantity "shall be taken into consideration where it is not material to
the interests of the buyer or where it is permitted by usage." 4 An
examination some years ago of trade practice in this country disclosed
that the problem of rejection for immaterial deviations from the con-
tract, on which buyers tend to seize in a falling market, had led to the
adoption of trade rules and contracts specifying permissible leeway.'
ULIS thus, in addition to a strong provision giving binding effect to
usages of the trade," strikes a balance between the substantial interests
of sellers and buyers which is in accord with business practice and the
basic expectations of the parties. Although, as we have seen, precise
rules are impossible, the Uniform Law removes technical difficulties
with which the prevailing law has become encrusted. ULIS certainly
would provide a more helpful route to a solution of these problems
than is presently open in view of the confusion which arises both in
deciding which national law governs and in applying an unfamiliar
foreign legal system.
Risk of Loss
Risk of loss presents the draftsmen of the Uniform Law with their
most significant and challenging opportunity for improvement. The
importance of the solution lies in the fact that, in spite of the widespread
practice of carrying insurance, there remain the highly practical prob-
42. ULIS art. 40, para. 2.
43. Honnold, Buyer's Right of Rejection, 97 U. PA. L. REV. 457, 464-66 (1949).
This same trade policy is reflected in the standard contracts recently prepared under
the auspices of the Economic Commission for Europe. See note 2 supra.
ULIS also has rather elaborate provisions which restrict buyer's power to reject
where seller's breach is not "fundamental." In these cases ULIS, borrowing the
German idea of Nachfrist, empowers the buyer to set a new reasonable time for per-
formance after which time the buyer may refuse to accept the goods. See ULIS
arts. 15 (definition of "fundamental" breach), 30 (non-fundamental breach as to
time), 35 (place), 53 (opportunity to replace or repair defective goods). Unlike
the Uniform Sales Act, the Uniform Commercial Code contains provisions designed,
in a few situations, to limit rejection for minor deviations. UCC §§ 2-608 (revocation
of acceptance); 2-612 (installment contracts); 2-508 (cure of improper tender or
delivery). On the rather awkward French rules, which may call for court inter-
vention in situations in which under American law and under ULIS a simple notice
by buyer may suffice, see HAmEL, op. cit. supra note 38, §§ 79-82, 134.
44. ULIS art. 14(a). On some of the problems of giving effect to custom under
existing law see Note, Custom and Trade Usage: Its Application to Commercial
Dealings and the Common Law, 55 COLum. L. REv. 1192 (1955) ; Honold, Letters
of Credit, Custom, Missing Documents and the Dixon Case, 53 COLm. L. REv. 504
(1953).
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lems of identifying the obligation to take out insurance, to press a claim
against the insurer, and to salvage damaged goods.
Traditional formulations of the law are not wholly satisfactory
for domestic commerce and are glaringly deficient for ocean shipments.
For historical reasons, the Uniform Sales Act approaches this and other
problems through the concept of "property"; subject to various excep-
tions, one starts from the proposition that the party who has "property"
in the goods bears the risk.' Since businessmen do not often draft their
hurried sales contracts in the light of this abstract concept, the act sets
forth a set of "presumptions" concerning their "intent" as to the loca-
tion of property, but the rules are complex and often call for speculation
concerning elusive or nonexistent states of mind, such as the "implied
assent" by one party to "appropriation" by the other.46 The difficulty
of applying these various rules to concrete situations is aggravated by
the failure of the rules to express or to reflect practical reasons for
allocating risk to one party rather than the other.
The Uniform Commercial Code sweeps the property theory aside,
and lays down rules specifically devoted to allocating risk in terms of
the physical acts done in the performance of sales contracts. In most
cases the results are not different from those which may be reached
under the Uniform Sales Act. But a striking gain in clarity and
predictability flows from dealing with risk as a separate problem; and
in formulating policy the attention to only one problem at a time
produces results which are better adapted to the problem at hand.
The Uniform Law for International Sales employs an approach
which falls between that of the Uniform Sales Act and the Uniform
Commercial Code. The new law does not employ the general concept
of "property," nor does it deal separately with the problem of risk.
Instead, to provide a fulcrum for allocating risk and for approaching
certain other problems of performance, the law creates a concept which,
in the original French text, is called "d6livrance" and which the
English translation renders as "delivery." But it is hazardous to use
this rather simple English word, which suggests merely a transfer of
possession, to encompass the complex mixture of fact and law which is
45. USA §22. Exceptions are stated in §§22(a) and 20(2) (reservation of
title for security does not hold risk on seller) and § 22 (b) (party who delays delivery
has risk with respect to loss which might not otherwise have occurred). Cf. Sale
of Goods Act, 1893, 56 & 57 Vict. ch. 71, §§ 16-20.
46. USA § 19, rules 4(1) and (2).
47. The Uniform Commercial Code devotes two sections (2-509 and 2-510) to
the problem of risk. The events which are determinative are receipt of the goods,
tender of delivery (by a non-merchant), shipment of the goods, and breach of con-
tract. For a comparison of the approach of the Uniform Sales Act and of the code
see Latty, Sales and Title and the Proposed Code, 16 LAw & CoN=MP. PRoB. 3
(1951).
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implicit in the Uniform Law's concept of "d6livrance." The basic
definition of "d~livrance" is the "handing over of goods which conform
with the contract.. ," " This reference to the "handing over" of
the goods suggests that there must be actual physical delivery to a buyer
who accepts possession.49 But under this language physical delivery
even into the buyer's hands does not achieve "d6livrance" in any case in
which the goods fail to "conform with the contract"; at this point one
is tempted to think of "d6livrance" as the same as seller's "performance"
of his contractual duties. But this rendering also is inaccurate, since
seller may fully perform his contractual duties by tendering the goods
to an unwilling buyer; this, however, is not "d~livrance" since there has
been no "handing over" of the goods. Unhappily, the definition must
be further elaborated for the usual case which calls for shipment of the
goods. In this event, subject to several exceptions, "ddlivrance" occurs
when the goods are "handed over to the carrier." " In this situation
also, the English term "delivery" can be misleading since the goods
have certainly not reached the buyer, and in maritime shipments often
they will be in the exclusive control of the seller through his retention
of a negotiable bill of lading.
The difficulty does not lie in the translation. No adequate English
word appears to be available and, indeed, the translation of the Uniform
Law into other languages encountered difficulty at this point.51 To
avoid confusion we are forced to the rather uncouth expedient of adher-
ing to the original term dilivrance in discussing this basic concept of
the Uniform Law.
The law's use of dilivrance and its allocation of the risk of loss can
be introduced by an example drawn from the venerable case of Tarling
v. Baxter." As generations of students have learned, the case concerned
a stack of hay which, under the agreement of sale, the buyer could take
away only after payment which was due over a month later. During
48. ULIS art. 20. For the effect of dilivrance on risk, see arts. 110, 111 discussed
at p. 319 infra.
49. Under article 19 of the 1939 Rome draft, "d6livrance' apparently did not
require delivery of the goods out of the seller's possession when the seller performed
all of the acts required of him. The new language of article 20 of the 1956 draft, in
requiring la reinise ("handing over") of the goods reflects a deliberate change in
approach. See REPORT OF THE DRAFTING Co aitssloN 32; Graue, Book Review, 5 Am.
J. Comp. L. 141, 143 (1956).
50. ULIS art. 21, para. 1.
51. Institut International L'Unification du Droit Priv6, Coordination des
Traductions du Project de Loi Uniforme Sur la Vente Internationale des Objets
Mobiliers Corporels 2, 3 (U.D.P. 1957-Etudes IV, Vente-Doc. 101) (May 1957)
(mimeo.).
52. 6 B. & C. 360, 108 Eng. Rep. 484 (K.B. 1827). The discussion in the text
simplifies the facts which, in the actual case, are complicated by buyer's delivery to
seller of a bill of exchange which the seller had negotiated to a third party.
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this period, the hay burned. Many will recall the decision that "prop-
erty" passed to the buyer on the making of the contract, and that the
buyer consequently was obliged to pay the price although he received no
hay. A rule of law based on the case was codified in the Sale of Goods
Act and in turn was carried into the Uniform Sales Act. 3
Under the Uniform Law for International Sales the result is
different. Our starting point is the general rule that risk passes to the
buyer on dilivrance."4 As we have seen, in this situation ddlivrance
requires the "handing over" of the goods to the buyer; while the goods
remain with the seller before the date on which buyer is obliged to take
the goods, the seller retains the risk of loss. This result, which is also
that of the Uniform Commercial Code, 5 seems distinctly preferable to
that of the older Anglo-American law. The question is, of course,
simply one of allocating risk; in the absence of an agreement or other
controlling circumstance to the contrary, the risk should be borne by the
party who can best guard against it. Usually, the one in possession and
control of goods is in the best position to guard against their loss and
also to insure the goods under standard policies covering buildings and
their contents5
The scene changes radically if either party fails to perform his
contract. Even in the absence of dilivrance, risk will pass to the
buyer "as from the date in which he is in delay in accepting delivery of
goods." 57 Conversely, as we have already seen, the seller makes
d'livrance only by handing over goods "which conform with the con-
tract"; thus, the fact that goods are defective when delivered to a
carrier prevents the risk of loss in transit from shifting to the buyer.
This rule is consistent with results which are possible under the Uni-
form Sales Act and with explicit provisions of the Uniform Commercial
Code." Indeed, any other result would impose on buyers the respon-
53. Sale of Goods Act, 1893, 56 & 57 Vict. ch. 71, § 18, rule 1; USA § 19, rule 1.
54. ULIS art. 109.
55. UCC §2-509(3). If seller is a merchant, risk passes only on "receipt" of
goods by the buyer, and otherwise on tender of delivery.
56. Insurers can cover risks more safely and thus more cheaply if they know the
type of building (concrete versus wood or thatch) and the type of goods customarily
stored there (iron versus gasoline). Only the possessor can insure on the basis of
known risks.
57. ULIS art. 110. (Emphasis added.) Cf. USA § 22(b); INcoTErms (1953):
"F.O.R.-F.O.B.," ff B5 (when buyer's failure to give necessary shipping instructions
delays shipment he shall bear "all risks of the goods from the expiration of the period
fixed" for his action); "F.A.S.," 1 B4; "F.O.B.," 1 B4; "C.I.F.," 1 B4.
58. USA § 19, rule 4(1) (appropriation of the contract "description
and in a deliverable state"). UCC §2-510(1) provides more explicitly: "Where a
tender or delivery of goods so fails to conform to the contract as to give a right of
rejection the risk of their loss remains on the seller until cure or acceptance." (Em-
phasis added.) This language, which modified earlier versions of the code so as to
relieve sellers from the excessive sanction of rejection for immaterial deviation from
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sibility for goods which are both damaged and defective, whereas if there
were no damage in transit the buyer could reject the goods for non-
conformity with the contract.
Although there are points in the present draft at which one might
be tempted to work for improvement, it is evident that these basic rules
achieve a workable and fair allocation of the problem of risk and cer-
tainly are more understandable to merchants from differing legal systems
than the antique and conflicting doctrines which now prevail.5"
Maritime Shipments and International Trade Terms
The problem of risk of loss in maritime shipments is particularly
stubborn. The Uniform Sales Act, operating through the property
concept, lays down presumptions under which risk passes to the buyer
when the goods are shipped, unless the contract requires the seller to
deliver the goods to the buyer or to pay the freight.' Even in land
commerce this rule encounters difficulty since freight expense may be
shared or absorbed by the seller without reasonable expectation of
assuming transit risks."' And in ocean shipments a number of practical
considerations-the widespread use of insurance, the frequent payment
against documents (including an insurance policy) prior to the arrival
of the goods, the difficulty of inspection prior to unloading-have led
to the firm custom that under the widely-used C.I.F. and C. & F. quota-
tions, risk during shipment falls on the buyer even though the price
covers the cost of ocean freight. This understanding, flatly contrary
to the presumptions of the Uniform Sales Act, has been given effect
by judicial decisions and is clearly articulated in the standard definitions
developed by foreign traders. 2
the contract, might well be considered in connection with continued work on the
Uniform Law for International Sales. See the comments of this writer in State of
New York, Law Revision Commission, Study of Uniform Commercial Code, Article 2
-Sales, LEG. Doc. No. 65(C) at 494-95 (1955).
59. On possibilities for improvement see note 58 supra, and the discussion of the
concept of dalivrance infra at pp. 324-26. ULIS is, in fact, even simpler than
the UCC since it avoids several nice but troublesome distinctions which must be
drawn in solving problems of risk under the Code, e.g.: (a) The distinction between
merchants and non-merchants under UCC § 2-509(3) which brings into play the loose
definition of "merchant" in § 2-104(1) ; (b) The transfer of risk to buyer for a
commercially reasonable time under UCC § 2-510(3) even prior to the stated date for
delivery or transfer of risk if buyer "repudiates or is otherwise in breach."
60. USA § 19, rules 4(2), (5).
61. NATIONAL FOREIGN TRADE COUNCIL, INC., REVISED AMERICAN FOREIGN TRADE
DEFINITONS-1941, II-C: "F.O.B. Freight Allowed" (the stating of a F.O.B. point
expresses intent for the passage of risk at this point, in spite of the seller's absorption
of freight expense); Cf. Id. II-F: "F.O.B. (named inland point in country of im-
portation)"; INCOTE MS (1953): "Freight or Carriage Paid to . . ." (transit risk
on seller in spite of his assumption of freight expense, even in absence of specific term
such as F.O.B. shipping point).
62. Seaver v. Lindsay Light Co., 233 N.Y. 273, 135 N.E. 329 (1922) ; Smith Co.
v. Marano, 267 Pa. 107, 110 At. 94 (1920) ; NATIONAL FOREIGN TRADE COUNCIL, INC.,
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The unsuitability of the Uniform Sales Act for foreign trade has
long been recognized. Over twenty years ago, dissatisfaction with the
act in this area led to a project for a federal sales act which, after various
vicissitudes, finally grew into the Uniform Commercial Code.63 Con-
sistent with this background, the code has many provisions which deal
with the practices peculiar to foreign trade, including detailed definitions
of the implications and legal consequences of several of the trade terms
such as "C.I.F." which are common to foreign commerce.64
At this point, the draftsmen of the Uniform Law for International
Sales have faced a troublesome question: How much detail concerning
the implications of the various foreign trade terms should be incorpo-
rated into the law? The amount of detail which might be employed is
suggested by the fact that the Uniform Commercial Code devotes five
pages to the implications of foreign trade terms; both Incoterms and
Revised American Foreign Trade Definitions require substantial book-
lets. The difficulty of the problem of statutory drafting is indicated by
the fact that the 1939 Rome draft contained brief provisions dealing
specifically with F.O.B., C. & F. and C.I.F. terms, but the 1951 Hague
Conference properly concluded that this abbreviated handling was
inadequate. The draftsmen then decided that it would be unwise to
attempt to incorporate into the law a complete statement of the complex
connotations of the various forms of price quotations and that no special
reference to them should be made.65 Instead, they have attempted to
solve the basic problems through brief and general rules.
RE isED AMmuc N FOREIGN TRADE DEFINITiONs-1941, IV: "C. & F."; id. V:
"C.I.F."; INcoTERmS (1953): "C. & F.," B-3; "C.I.F.," ff B-3. Risk remains on
the seller during ocean transit under the quotation "Ex ship . . . (named port ot
destination)!" Id.: "Ex Ship."
63. In 1936 a committee of The Merchants' Association of New York prepared a
draft of a federal sales act; this project was later suspended in favor of a revision
of the Uniform Sales Act, around which the Uniform Commercial Code grew. See
Thomas, The Federal Sales Bill as Viewed by Merchant and Practitioner, 26 VA.
L. REV. 537 (1940); Lewis, The Proposed New Commercial Code, 20 PA. B.A.Q.
131, 134 (1949). Much earlier Professor Williston had drafted a federal sales act
which included provisions designed to meet the problems of international trade; in
1922 this bill was approved by the American Bar Association. 47 A.B.A. REP. 52,
288 (1922).
64. UCC §§ 2-319 to -325. Cf. Ward & Rosenthal, The Need for the Uniform
Commercial Code in Foreign Trade, 63 HARv. L. REV. 589 (1950). The problems of
letters of credit, which play a central part in international sales, are the subject
of article 5 of the code; article 7 contains numerous detailed provisions on bills of
lading which are important to foreign trade.
65. HAGUE CoNFEaNc-1951, ACTE FINAL pt. X, at 277 (1952); RFPORT OF
TEm DRAFTING COMMISSION 43. Part of the problem may lie in the fact that merchants
on the two sides of the Atlantic have yet to reconcile the differences between Revised
American Foreign Trade Definitions and Incoterms. See Rabel, The Hague
Conference m the Unification of Sales Law, 1 AM. J. CoMp. L. 58, 62 (1952) (barriers
towards more complete unification may be removed with the increasing use of Inco-
terms).
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There are reasons which support this choice. The attempt to lay
down statutory definitions for terms used in contracts suffers from an
inherent difficulty: In a contract, as elsewhere, the meanings of words
reflect the settings in which they are used and the practices out of which
they grow. A statutory formulation may be too rigid for the variegated
and changing practices of commerce. 6
Against this difficulty, however, must be balanced the danger that
it may not be possible to lay down brief general rules on risk in inter-
national shipments which will have sufficient content to be helpful. The
problem is sufficiently important and suggestive of wider problems of
statutory draftsmanship to warrant further examination.
As we have seen, under the ULIS risk passes when the seller ac-
complishes dilivrance, and if the contract calls for shipment, d6livrance
occurs "when the goods are handed over to the carrier." 07 This test
provides a clear and realistic starting point for the solution of problems
of risk in the vast majority of international transactions which call for
shipment of goods to the buyer. The "handing over" of the goods to
a carrier is a clearly defined physical event which is usually sharply
identifiable and lends itself to clear translation in a multilingual inter-
national statute."8 In addition, there is a body of mercantile practice
66. The Uniform Commercial Code has gone quite far in providing statutory
definitions for contract terms. Several relate to quotations often employed in foreign
trade. UCC §§2-319 ("F.O.B." and "F.A.S."), 2-320 ("C.I.F." and "C. & F."),
2-322 (delivery "Ex-ship"), 2-324 ("No Arrival, No Sale"), 2-325 ("Letter of
Credit," "Confirmed Credit"). In addition, the code sets forth certain phrases which
when used in contracts will negate implied warranties. UCC § 2-316(2), (3) (a).
Unless these statutory definitions of terms, which will appear in a wide variety of
contractual settings, are handled with restraint they can lead to interpretations quite
out of harmony with the understandings of the parties who employ them. See the
comments of this writer in State of New York, Law Revision Commission, Study
of Uniform Commercial Code, Article 2-Sales, LEG. Doc. No. 65(C) at 408-09, 431-32
(1955). Cf. Gower, F.O.B. Contracts, 19 MoDERN L. REv. 417, 418 (1956).
67. ULIS art. 21 provides: "Where the contract of sale implies the carriage of
the goods, unless it is provided that delivery is to be effected at the place of destina-
tion, delivery shall be deemed to take place when the goods are handed over to the
carrier. When some part of the carriage has to be effected by the seller in his own
transport or in transport hired by him on his own account, delivery shall take place
when the goods are handed over to the carrier with whom a contract of carriage has
been made on the buyer's account. Should the carriage of the goods have to be effected
by several carriers acting successively, and the contract of sale thereby require the
seller to make one or more contracts to cover the whole of the carriage, delivery shall
be accomplished by handing over the goods to the first carrier. ...
'Where the carrier to whom, in accordance with the provisions of the first para-
graph, the goods have to be handed over is a carrier by water, delivery shall be
effected either by placing the goods on board ship or by placing them alongside,
whichever the terms of the contract provide, unless the seller shall be entitled, accord-
ing to the terms of the contract or usage, to present to the buyer a received for
shipment bill of lading or other similar document."
68. ULIS art. 21, quoted note 67 supra. ULIS deals separately (arts. 59-61) with
the obligations of the parties concerning the transfer of documents relating to the
goods. ULIS thereby happily avoids the problem, encountered in Anglo-American
formulations, as to whether the documents embody the "property" in the goods and
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which suggests that the allocation of transit risks to buyers reflects
significant practical considerations.69 The buyer, who is in the presence
of the goods and the carrier when the damage is discovered, is usually
in a better position to negotiate the settlement of a claim against a carrier
or insurer than is a distant seller. If, as is often the case, the damage
during transit is minor or relates to only part of the goods, the buyer
can more conveniently salvage the goods; this result also tends to reduce
the grounds for rejection of goods by buyers who find that the trans-
action has become unprofitable during the period required for shipment
and who could by rejection force the seller into the awkward position of
choosing between redisposing of the goods in a distant market and
negotiating with the buyer for their redisposition at a disadvantageous
price.
The complexities of mercantile practice, unhappily, have not per-
mitted the draftsmen of the Uniform Law for International Sales to
stop with the simple and clear rule which we have just examined. One
troublesome problem arises with respect to initial movement of the goods
preliminary to their delivery to a carrier, such as hauling the goods to
the railroad in seller's trucks or through the instrumentality of a freight
forwarder. In an apparent attempt to deal with such problems, the
ULIS states: "When some part of the carriage has to be effected by
the seller in his own transport or in transport hired by him on his own
account, delivery shall take place when the goods are handed over to the
carrier with whom a contract of carriage has been made on the buyer's
account." o This language, in actual application, could be troublesome,
for the distinction between shipment on the seller's "account" and ship-
ment on the buyer's "account" carries legal overtones which come close
to begging the question of responsibility, and which, like all terms with
doctrinal implications, presents special difficulties for a multilingual
international statute which must be understandable in the light of
thereby affect risk of loss and other legal attributes associated with the "property"
idea. See notes 45, 47 supra; 2 WILLISTON, SALEs § 305 n.16 (rev. ed. 1948).
This language of ULIS § 21, para. 1, suggests that "handing over" to an inland
carrier shifts the risk prior to loading, unless the contract imposes this added obli-
gation of loading. On the other hand, ULIS § 21, para. 3, states that in water ship-
ment seller must place the goods "on board ship" unless the seller is entitled, "accord-
ing to the terms of the contract or usage," to present a "received for shipment bill of
lading or other similar document." On the conflict over the acceptability of "received
for shipment" bills of lading see INcormms (1953): "C.I.F.," ff A7; UCC §2-323(1);
INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, UNIFORM CUSTOMS AND PRACTI cE FOR
COMMERCIAL DOCUMENTARY CREDITS art. 19 (1951).
69. See the definitions of trade terms cited note 61 supra. The balance of con-
venience tips towards retention of transit risk by sellers in the unusual cases where
it would be difficult to determine whether damage occurred in transit or existed at
shipment, and where any repair of the goods requires the personal intervention of
seller.
70. ULIS art. 21, para. 1, quoted in context note 67 supra. (Emphasis added.)
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differing legal backgrounds."' The problem of draftsmanship is ex-
ceedingly thorny in view of the delicate gradations by which preliminary
shipment under seller's control shades into transport by an independent
carrier, but there is reason to hope that the draftsmen can materially
improve upon the present formulation.7"
For the bulk of our foreign commerce which moves by water, ULIS
as it now stands provides the clean-cut rule that risk passes when the
goods are placed "on board ship." '3 Through this and through other
useful provisions dealing with the mechanism of documentary trans-
fers,74 ULIS probably achieves as helpful a degree of precision as is
feasible in light of the varying patterns of trade practices and under-
standings current in different parts of the world. Until the more
detailed implications of trade terms achieve a degree of standardization
which would justify their incorporation into an international code, ULIS
can serve the useful function of freeing foreign commerce from the
embarrassment of a statutory formulation in the Uniform Sales Act
which contradicts mercantile understanding for the bulk of our overseas
trade, while removing the uncertainty over whether the basic legal rule
stems from American law or some foreign system, the implications of
which are beyond the reach of our merchants and their lawyers.
III. LEGAL CONCEPTS AND INTERNATIONAL DRAFTING: D-LIVRANCE
The Uniform Law's key concept, ddlivrance, as we have seen, does
not describe an observable physical event but is rather a concept created
71. This "account" language of article 21 might even be read as inviting return
to the general rule of the Uniform Sales Act that the party who bears the shipping
expense bears the risk, but the report of the draftsmen indicates that the provision deals
only with the narrow problem of preliminary transport. REPORT OF THE DRAFTING
COMmissioN 52. This narrow reading receives support from the fact that the language
refers to situations where "some part" of the carriage is to be effected in the described
manner. In addition, article 112 of the Uniform Law reads: "The fact that the
parties have inserted terms in the contract concerning expenses, and in particular the
fact that they have agreed that such expenses shall be borne by the seller, shall not
of itself suffice to pass the risk." Concerning the continental practice of reliance on
the draftsmen's report to deal with ambiguities in the text, and the difficulties of this
approach under English law, see GuTTERIDGE, COMPARATIVE LAW 172 (1949).
72. Consideration should be given to the workability of a rule expressed in terms
of delivery to an independent carrier which does not perform its duties under the
seller's control. In a transaction calling for delivery in seller's own trucks or ships,
in the absence of agreement, risk of loss would remain on seller during transit since
the contract would not call for delivery of the goods to an independent carrier. In
all such cases in which seller is in possession of the goods during transit, the same
practical considerations apply as those which call for holding risk on seller while
the goods remain on his premises. See text accompanying note 56 supra. These
general rules of ULIS are, of course, subject to agreements to the contrary, including
the use of a trade term such as "Ex ship (port of destination)" which is understood
to postpone the transfer of risk until the goods reach the specified point. See INCO-
Tis 60 (1953).
73. ULIS art. 21, para. 3, quoted note 67 supra. If the contract calls for placing
the goods alongside a ship, risk passes at that point. With respect to the "on board"
versus "received for shipment" problem, see note 68 supra.
74. See ULIS arts. 59-61.
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by the law with features so unique that it cannot successfully be trans-
lated. Perhaps the reader should again be reminded that d~livrance is
quite different from physical "delivery," for dglivrance can occur while
seller keeps control of the goods through a negotiable bill of lading.
Nor is dilivrance merely another name for the passing of the risk of
loss, since risk can pass before dglivrance when buyer is late in taking
the goods.7- We therefore must ask whether it is wise to give this
concept a central place in the Uniform Law, the chief virtues of which
should be its clarity to businessmen and lawyers coming from widely
different linguistic and legal backgrounds.
Is a single unifying concept like dglivrance needed to aid in the
solution of various problems of the law of sales? The Uniform Law
uses this concept not only in connection with risk of loss but also as a
tool for determining the point at which the buyer is obliged to pay for
the goods; 76 but there too d~livrance proves to be unwieldy. In most
sales contracts, d~livrance occurs when seller ships the goods, but the
buyer is rarely obliged to pay the price at that point. In some contracts,
the crucial obligation is the establishment of an irrevocable letter of
credit in advance of shipment and sometimes even in advance of manu-
facturing the goods; in others, buyer must pay only in exchange for
shipping documents which may be tendered while the goods are in the
course of shipment or after arrival. In none of these cases is payment
due on dilivrance. The attempt to use the concept of dtlivrance in
defining the time for payment therefore drives the draftsmen into mak-
ing complex exceptions which, it must be said, never quite solve the
problem.77 And the difficulties resulting from the use of this complex
concept are quite unnecessary, for the point at which buyer must pay
the price can be defined more simply and clearly in terms of the im-
portant physical steps in the performance of the contract, and notably
75. ULIS art. 110. See text accompanying note 57 supra.
76. ULIS art. 80: "Unless otherwise provided by the contract or by usage,
delivery (dilivraiwe, in the French text) of the goods and payment of the price are
concurrent conditions . . . ." Article 81 adds a number of exceptions to this general
rule. See note 77 infra.
77. ULIS art. 81: 'Where the contract of sale implies the carriage of the goods,
and where it is not stipulated that delivery [dfliverance] shall be made at the place
of destination and where, according to the terms of the contract or usage, payment
of the price is not fixed for a date subsequent to that of delivery, the seller may
postpone despatch of the goods, because the price has not been paid, whenever the
contract of carriage does not give the seller a right of disposal over the goods during
transit. Where the seller has despatched the goods because he possessed the right of
disposal thereof during transit, he may, so long as the price remains unpaid, object
to the goods being handed to the buyer at the destination." It is evident that these
various exceptions leave far behind the general rule that payment is due on ddlivrance.
The language of article 81 also seems unfortunately to focus on the type of control
under the contract of carriage which the seller obtains, rather than on the shipping
arrangements which the contract permits or which is legally permissible in the
absence of contract stipulation.
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by reference to the surrender of control over the goods."8 ULIS would
be improved if both the problems of risk of loss and the point for
payment of the price were solved on their own merits in terms of the
physical events in the performance of the sales contract which are
appropriate to each.
From these specific instances there emerges a principle of general
applicability. Draftsmen of any international document must be
especially wary of complicated legal concepts which are either meaning-
less or deceptive to people of a different legal tradition and language.
Consequently, the art of drafting for international use, even more than
most difficult tasks of legal writing, requires that the problem be stripped
down to concrete events for which practical consequences can be de-
scribed.79 Adherence to this principle in the final work of polishing the
current draft of the Uniform Law for International Sales would ma-
terially improve its value and acceptability for general adoption. 0
Only the most unrelenting specialist would be willing to pursue
much further the handling of the body of sales law in ULIS. But there
are two additional features of the new Uniform Law which deserve
attention.
Salvage
The great distances which often intervene between seller and
buyer in international transactions aggravate the problems which arise
where buyers, either rightfully or wrongfully, refuse to accept the goods.
In addition to the measures which we have seen to reduce the grounds
for unwarranted rejection, ULIS creates important principles tending
78. Cf. UCC § 2-310 (specific rules on the point in the sales transaction at which
payment is due).
79. Experience has adequately shown the problem of the use of legal terms,
which inevitably have local connotations, in international drafting. See Wolfson,
The English and French Carriage of Goods by Sea Enactments, 4 INT'L & CoMP. L.Q.
508, 525, 532 (1955) ("excepted perils") ; Matteucci, The Methods of the Unification
of Law, in 2 UNIFIcATION OF LAW, YEARB:o 1956, at 3, 62-65 (1957). Cf.
GUTTERIDGE, COmPARATIVE LAW 155 (2d ed. 1949) (separate handling of risk).
80. The Uniform Law uses certain other concepts which, although less trouble-
some than that of dilivrance, seem to fall somewhat short of the ideal for international
drafting. Following are two examples from article 27, followed by the rendering ot
these concepts in the English translation: "r~solution de plein droit" ("ipso facto
avoided") ; "resoudre le contrat" ("avoid the contract'). Although it is possible to
work out the meaning of these concepts from other sections of the Uniform Law, it
is evident that references to "avoidance" of the contract is a figure of speech under-
standable only in the light of local understandings. The entire contract is not
"avoided," for ULIS clearly states the useful rule that the injured party retains the
right to recover damages for its breach. ULIS art. 88. The essential question is
sometimes whether the buyer may reject goods which the seller tenders, and sometimes
whether he has the power to notify seller that he will not accept future tenders of goods.
The ideal for international drafting would call for stating the rule in such concrete
terms.
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towards the efficient redisposition of goods which may have been
rejected rightfully.
The Uniform Law treatment of this matter is noteworthy not only
for the substance of the provisions but also for the admirable handling of
the problems of draftsmanship. Some of the language of ULIS conse-
quently deserves examination. For example, a buyer who has received
goods which he rejects "shall be bound to preserve them on behalf of
the seller"; even though the goods are not in the buyer's possession, if
they are "placed at his disposal at their destination," he shall be "bound
to take possession of them on behalf of the seller, provided that this may
be done without payment of the price and without appreciable incon-
venience or expense." 81 One who thus is under a duty to preserve
goods for another may store or sell the goods; he must sell the goods if
they are "subject to loss or rapid deterioration." ' These rules of the
Uniform Law, somewhat stronger than the salvage provisions of the
Uniform Commercial Code, are useful to reduce the waste resulting
from spoilage and unnecessary storage costs, to keep goods moving in
the channels of commerce, and thus to reduce the amount in con-
troversy.8
Buyer's Right To Force Delivery
Perhaps of greater psychological than practical interest is the
difficulty which the draftsmen encountered in dealing with buyer's right
to force delivery from a seller who wrongfully withholds the goods.
Although on the Continent this right is widely established, it was
thought that uniform rules governing the problem would cut too deeply
into Anglo-Saxon traditions for a limited remedy of "specific perform-
ance." 84 Consequently, the Uniform Law, after providing for specific
81. ULIS art. 104. Recognizing that there is no reason to require buyer so to
act when the seller is in a position to help himself, article 104 concludes: "This
provision shall not apply where the seller or a person authorized to take charge ot
the goods on his behalf is present at such destination." Cf. ULIS art. 103.
82. ULIS arts. 105, 106, 107. To protect a seller who incurs costs in connection
with the goods ULIS creates a power which we are accustomed to calling a "lien,"
but which ULIS expresses as seller's "right to retain [the goods] until he has received
from the buyer the cost of preserving them." ULIS art. 103. At this point and
throughout the Uniform Law's sections on preservation of the goods the language
deals in concrete terms with specific practical problems. As a result, the drafting
is admirably clear; the contrast with legal formulations cast in more doctrinal terms
is inescapable.
83. The Uniform Commercial Code specifically deals only with a duty of salvage
by merchant buyers. UCC § 2-603. But in an indirect manner a duty of salvage is
imposed on sellers by restricting their right to recover the full price even against a
buyer who wrongfully refuses to accept the goods. UCC §2-709. For a helpful
analysis of problems of salvage at the various steps in performance see LAGEmGRN,
DEiivERY OF GOODS AND TRANSFER OF PROPERTY AND RISK IN THE LAW OF SALE 18
(1954).
84. REPoRT OF THE DRAFTING ComMlsSIoN 32-33; Rabel, The Draft of a Uniform
Law Co wening Internatio al Sales of Goods, in UNIFICATION OF LAW 57, 63 (1948).
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recovery of goods under fairly limited circumstances, provides that even
this limited remedy only applies "should this be possible and permitted
by the municipal law of the Court in which the action is brought." 85
The lack of uniformity which results from this bow to the supposed
intransigence of Anglo-Saxon tradition is probably not serious. But
there is a bit of irony in the fact that as early as 1855 the British
Mercantile Law Commission, after an extensive survey of opinion in
commercial and legal circles in England and Scotland, recommended
that the rules of England on this point be assimilated to the broad civil
law right of recovery in force in Scotland, and that legislation was
enacted to enforce this recommendation."6 Legal diversity is indeed a
stubborn foe.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
The world market for goods needs the support of a unified legal
framework. The project for a Uniform Law for International Sales
represents an important step towards that goal; it deserves the support
of countries with a stake in international commerce. Certainly the
United States cannot maintain its pretensions to leadership in world
trade and in the international community and at the same time rest in
ignorance and lethargy with respect to such constructive work.
7
In spite of the important work which has been done, much remains.
Significant decisions therefore must be taken with respect to the channels
through which the law can best be brought to completion. The Inter-
national Institute for the Unification of Private Law, which over the
years has carried the law to its present advanced stage, has strong
representation among the nations of Europe, but only scattered member-
85. ULIS art. 27. See also ULIS arts. 51, 60. Cf. art. 72 (similar exception
with respect to local rules on price recovery).
86. Second Report, Mercantile Law Commnission, 354 PAR.. PAPERs 10 (1855).
This recommendation resulted in the Mercantile Law Amendment Act, 1856, 19 & 20
Vict. ch. 97, § 2. For discussion of the manner in which this provision was carried
forward into the Sale of Goods Act and ultimately into the Uniform Sales Act, see
HONNOLD, SALES AND SAtis FINANCING 208-09 (1954).
87. The government of the Netherlands, which convened the 1951 Hague Con-
ference, has transmitted the 1956 draft of ULIS to the United States Department of
State inviting comments on the draft for consideration at the forthcoming diplomatic
conference. A modest first step would be a thoughtful response to this invitation.
There are now distinct signs of increasing interest in the international unification
of law. The United States sent a strong delegation of observers to the 1956 Hague
Conference on Private International Law. And in August 1957 the House of Dele-
gates of the American Bar Association created a special committee, under the chair-
manship of Joe C. Barrett, Esq., on the International Unification of Private Law.
See 1957 HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFOR-A!
STATE LAws 152, 299 (1958); 82 A.B.A. Rep. 42, 176 (1957); 43 A.B.A.J. 1056
(1957). Cf. Yntema, Unification of Law in the United States, in UNIFICATION OF
LAW 301, 317 (1948) (reasons for past lethargy); Wortley, Great Britain and the
Movement for the Unification. of Private Law Since 1948, 32 TUL. L. REv. 541 (1958).
A UNIFORM LAW FOR INTERNATIONAL SALES
ship in other parts of the world. The problem which the Uniform Law
faces is truly world-wide and requires concerted effort and support
on the widest possible basis."8
The final stage of preparation and promulgation seems to call for
technical work and international collaboration under the sponsorship of
the United Nations. This sponsorship would augment the substantial
work of the UN at nonpolitical levels which over the years has
strengthened the international community through its collaboration in
constructive work outside the arena of ideological conflict.8 9
The approach and method employed in the final work on the law
also will be important in determining the final success of the project.
The sale of goods is a highly practical affair; legal solutions to its
problems can be successful only in the degree to which they are based
on an intimate knowledge of commercial practices and needs. A helpful
example is provided by the International Chamber of Commerce which
in the course of formulating Incoterms, its highly useful definition of the
implications of international trade terms, gathered and published de-
tailed information on world-wide understandings and practices. 90 A
further source, not only of commercial practice but also of enlightened
judgment on commercial need, is emerging from the standard contracts
for the international sale of specific commodities which are being
developed by the Economic Commission for Europe. 1  The careful
study of sources such as these can help to illumine the final decisions
concerning the areas of international commercial practice which are
sufficiently standardized for embodiment in a legal rule. Indeed, even
in advance of the international adoption of a uniform law, valuable
material would become available to merchants and their lawyers drafting
88. There is every reason to avoid regional approaches to the problem. The
project for a Uniform Law for International Sales commenced by the Inter-American
Juridical Committee (see note 9 supra) faces the same problem of bridging under-
standing between civil-law and common-law traditions which confronts ULIS. There
is no reason to complicate the problems of concerns engaged in foreign commerce
with one "uniform" law for inter-American trades and another for inter-European
transactions, which would leave the problems involved in trans-Atlantic and trans-
Pacific trade unresolved. ULIS art. 3 contains significant provisions whereby two or
more signatory states may exclude trade among themselves from the Uniform Law.
By this route countries with common-law traditions could retain their current legal
scheme. But before taking such a step the countries involved should seriously
consider the extent to which their rules on international commerce are actually uniform
and in keeping with current business practices. See note 1 supra. On the more
complete unification which has been achieved among the Scandinavian countries, see
materials cited note 11 supra.
89. See GnTnzmGa, COmPARATIVE LAW 183-84 (1949); Bagge, Internatiotua
Unification of Commercial Law, in UNICAmTON oF LAW 253, 267-69 (1948). For
a summary of the work which the United Nations has already done in the field of
the unification of law, see UNiFIcATioN OF LAW, YEARBooK 1956 (1957).
90. INcoTERms (1953).
91. See note 2 supra,
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sales contracts, to courts and arbitrators facing controversies over inter-
national practice, and to any State concerned with the revision of its
commercial law.'
Unification in Its Wider Context
Nothing could be more false than to suppose that a movement for
the unification of commercial law is a novel notion for which the time is
not quite ripe. We should not forget that the current isolation of com-
mercial law into small, separate and conflicting national systems is but
one of the consequences of the narrow nationalism of recent centuries
which fragmented wider units of cooperation developed under the
Roman Empire and under regimes of autonomous international com-
mercial practice. 3 The most striking part of the story is the slowness
of our progress in piecing these fragments together.
One thing, at least, is clear: in a world shrinking so rapidly, suc-
cessful isolation is the least likely of prospects. Perhaps it is not too
much to hope that nations, by joining together to meet the day-to-day
needs of their mutual trade, may at the same time help weave the fabric
of cooperation necessary for the development of an international legal
order.
92. At a later date consideration should be given to the role comparable to that
performed on a national basis by the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. Very
possibly the UN could assume this function by making generally available the de-
cisions applying and interpreting the Uniform Law; such tools could assist in the
rebirth of a common law for international trade. See ULIS art. 1: Questions not
expressly settled by ULIS but within its scope "shall be settled according to the
general principles on which this law is based."
93. See Kennedy, The Unification of Law, 10 J. Soc'y ComP. LEG. (its.) 212, 217
(1910) (this article deserves reading in its entirety for its perceptive as well as
eloquent analysis of the problem of unification) ; Hamel, The Geneva Conventions
w; Negotiable Instruments and Methods of Unifying Private Law, in UNIFICATION
oF LAw 270-72 (1948).
